Are public sector managers a "bureaucratic burden"? The case of English public hospitals

Although managers are, globally, a central part of the new public management reform agenda, in recent years policy makers, the media and the general public have raised concerns about their effectiveness and contribution. In some countries, notably the UK and the US, this debate has been heavily influenced by Public Choice Theory (PCT), which depicts ‘bureaucrats’ as rent seeking, self-serving individuals. In this study, focusing on the case of acute care hospital trusts in the English National Health Service, we formally test whether public sector managers represent a ‘bureaucratic burden’. Using a longitudinal database spanning six years (2007-2012) and employing a dynamic panel data model, the findings reveal that, contrary to PCT assumptions, managers do not engage, in the main, in rent seeking behaviour and, crucially, appear to have a positive impact on organisational performance. Implications for theory, policy and practice are discussed